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Abstract We propose a semi-supervised online banking fraud analysis
and decision support approach. During a training phase, it builds a profile
for each customer based on past transactions. At runtime, it supports
the analyst by ranking unforeseen transactions that deviate from the
learned profiles. It uses methods whose output has a immediate statistical
meaning that provide the analyst with an easy-to-understand model of
each customer’s spending habits. First, we quantify the anomaly of each
transaction with respect to the customer historical profile. Second, we
find global clusters of customers with similar spending habits. Third,
we use a temporal threshold system that measures the anomaly of the
current spending pattern of each customer, with respect to his or her
past spending behavior. As a result, we mitigate the undertraining due
to the lack of historical data for building of well-trained profiles (of fresh
users), and the users that change their (spending) habits over time. Our
evaluation on real-world data shows that our approach correctly ranks
complex frauds as “top priority”.
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1 Introduction
The popularity of Internet banking has led to an increase of frauds, resulting in
substantial financial losses [15,4]. Banking frauds increased 93% in 2009–2010 [6],
and 30% in 2012–2013 [8].
Internet banking frauds are difficult to analyze and detect because the fraud-
ulent behavior is dynamic, spread across different customer’s profiles, and dis-
persed in large and highly imbalanced datasets (e.g., web logs, transaction logs,
spending profiles). Moreover, customers rarely check their online banking history
such regularly that they are able to discover fraud transactions timely [15].
We notice that most of the existing approaches build black box models that
are not very useful in manual investigation, making the process slower. In addi-
tion, those based on baseline profiling are not adaptive, also due to cultural and
behavioral differences that vary from country to country. Instead of focusing on
pure detection approaches, we believe that more research efforts are needed to-
ward systems that support the investigation, and we had the unique opportunity
to work on a real-world, anonymized dataset.
In this paper we propose BankSealer, an effective online banking semi-
supervised decision support and fraud analysis system. BankSealer automati-
cally ranks frauds and anomalies in bank transfer transactions and prepaid phone
and debit cards transactions. During a training phase, it builds a local, global,
and temporal profile for each user. The local profile models past user behav-
ior to evaluate the anomaly of new transactions by means of a novel algorithm
that uses the Histogram Based Outlier Score (HBOS). The global profiling clus-
ters users according to their transactions features via an iterative version of
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN). For
this, we use Cluster-Based Local Outlier Factor (CBLOF). This approach allows
to handle undertraining, which is particularly relevant for new users, which lack
of training data. The temporal profile aims to model transactions in terms of
time-dependent attributes. For this, we design a series of thresholds and measure
the anomaly in terms of the percentage gap from the thresholds once they are
exceeded. We handle the concept drift of the scores with an exponential decay
function that assigns lower weights to older profiles.
We tested the BankSealer on real-world data with a realistic ground truth
(e.g., credential stealing, banking trojan activity, and frauds repeated over time)
in collaboration with domain experts. Our system ranked fraud and anomalies
with up to 98% detection rate. Given the good results, a leading Italian bank is
deploying a version of BankSealer in their environment to analyze frauds.
In summary, our main contributions are:
– a general framework for online semi-supervised outlier-detection based on
the marginal distribution of the attributes of the user’s transactions.
– a combination of different models to discover different types of frauds. The
scores calculated by BankSealer have a clear statistical meaning, aiding
the analyst’s activity. Our approach is adaptive to non-stationary sources
and can deal with concept drift and data scarcity.
– We developed an automatic decision support system for banking frauds,
evaluated it in real-world setting, and deployed it to a large national bank.
2 Online Banking Fraud Detection: Goals and Challenges
Our goal is to support the analysis of (novel) frauds and anomalies by analyz-
ing bank transfer logs, prepaid cards and phone recharges. From an analysis
of the literature (summarized in §6) and a real-world dataset obtained from a
large national bank (described in §4.1), we found peculiar characteristics that
make the analysis of these datasets particularly challenging: skewed and unbal-
anced distribution of the attribute values, high number of nominal attributes,
high cardinality associated with some of attributes (e.g., IP and IBAN take sev-
eral thousands of distinct values). We also noticed the prevalence of users who
perform a low number of transactions—an issue not considered in the literature.
Given the scarcity of labeled datasets, such a system must be able to work in
an unsupervised or semi-supervised fashion. This conflicts with the requirement
of the system being able to provide “readable” evidence to corroborate each
alert. These peculiarities have remarkable implications for the typical statistical
and data mining methods used in the outlier detection field.
3 Approach and System Description
BankSealer characterizes the users of the online banking web application by
means of a local, a global and a temporal profile, which are built during a training
phase. As depicted in Fig. 1, the training phase takes as input a list of transac-
tions. As summarized in Tab. 1 we take into account three types of transactions.
Each type of profile (i.e., local, global, temporal) extracts different statistical fea-
tures from the transaction attributes (e.g., average, minimum, maximum, actual
value), according to the type of model built.
BankSealer works both under semi-supervised and unsupervised assump-
tions by using a sample of the unlabeled dataset as training data. In the first case,
the assumption is that the training data contains only legitimate transactions.
In the second case, which is more realistic, the assumption is that the training
dataset contains frauds, although these are a minority. As shown by [5,13], we
can safely assume that the data in input contains frauds but, due to the fact
that they are rare, the learned model is unbiased.
Once the profiles are built, BankSealer processes new transactions and
ranks them according to their anomaly score and the predicted risk of fraud.
The anomaly score quantifies the statistical likelihood of a transaction being a
fraud w.r.t. the learned profiles. The risk of fraud prioritizes the transactions by
means of anomaly score and amount.
BankSealer is not a classifier: It provides the analysts with a ranked list of
fraudulent transactions, along with the anomaly score of each user. Top-ranked
transactions have higher priority. As described in §1, the rationale behind this
design decision is that analysts must investigate reported alerts in any case:
Therefore, the focus is on collecting and correctly ranking evidence that support
the analysis of fraudulent behavior, rather than just flagging transactions.
3.1 Local Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterizes each user’s individual spending pat-
terns. During training, we aggregate the transactions by user and approximate
each feature distribution by a histogram. More precisely, we calculate the em-
pirical marginal distribution of the features of each user’s transactions. This
representation is simple, readable and effective.
Table 1: List of attributes for each type of transaction. “CC ASN” is the country
code of the autonomous system of the client’s IP. “Card type” takes values such as
“Mastercard” or “VISA”. Attributes in bold are hashed for anonymity needs.
Dataset Attributes
Bank Transfers Amount, CC ASN, IP, IBAN, IBAN CC, Timestamp, Recipient
Phone recharges Amount, CC ASN, IP, Phone operator, Phone number, Timestamp
Prepaid Cards Amount, Card type, Card number, CC ASN, IP, Timestamp
At runtime, we calculate the anomaly score of each new transaction using
the HBOS [7] method. The HBOS computes the probability of a transaction
according to the marginal distribution learned. As described in §3.1, we improved
the HBOS to account for the variance of each feature and to allow the analyst
to weight the features differently according to the institution’s priorities.
Training and Feature Extraction. The features are the actual values of all
the attributes listed in Tab. 1. During training we estimate the marginal distribu-
tion of each feature using uni-variate histograms in a way similar to what is done
in HBOS [7,17,13]. However, we do not consider correlation between features in
order to gain lower spatial complexity and better readability of the histograms.
Uni-variate histograms are indeed directly readable by analysts who get a clear
idea of the typical behavior by simply looking at the profile. In addition, they
easily allow to compute the anomaly score as the sum of the contributions of
each feature, giving an intuitive justification of the resulting anomaly score. For
categorical attributes (e.g., IP, CC), we count the occurrences of each category.
For numerical attributes (e.g., Amount, timestamp) we adopt a static binning
and count how many values falls inside each bin. After this, we estimate the
marginal frequency of the features, computing the relative frequency.
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. We score each new transac-
tion using HBOS [7]. It considers the relative frequency of each bin to quantify
the log-likelihood of the transaction to be drawn from the marginal distribution.
In other words, for each feature ti of the transaction t we calculate log
1
histi(ti)
,
where histi indicates the frequency of the i-th feature. The resulting values are
summed to form the anomaly score HBOSi(t). The logarithm makes the score less
sensitive to errors caused by floating point precision. To account for the higher
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Figure 1: BankSealer architecture.
relevance of frauds in high-amount transactions, we multiply the anomaly score
by the transaction amount.
Feature Normalization, Weighting and Rare Values. One of the main
drawbacks of the original HBOS is that it does not take into account the variance
of the features. For example, if Alice typically uses the banking web application
from 5 distinct IPs and Bob from 2, the HBOS for Alice would be much lower
than the HBOS for Bob. However, their activity is equally legitimate. To avoid
this problem we apply a min-max normalization [9, pp. 71–72] to the histogram,
where the minimum is zero, and the maximum is the highest bin.
In addition to the normalization, we added a weighting coefficient wi to each
feature to allow the analyst to tune the system according to the institution’s
priorities. In our experiments, however, we fixed all the weights at 1, except for
IP and IBAN, which were fixed at 0.5 because of their high variance.
When a feature value has never occurred during training for a user (i.e., zero
frequency within the local profile), the respective transaction may be assigned
a high anomaly score. However, a user may have just changed his spending
habits legitimately, thus causing false positives. To mitigate this, we calculate
the frequency of unseen values as k/1 − f , where f is the frequency of that
value calculated within a particular cluster, if the global profiling is able to
find a cluster for that user. Otherwise, f is calculated on the entire dataset.
This method quantifies the “rarity” of a feature value with respect to the global
knowledge. The parameter k is an arbitrarily small, non-zero number. In our
experiments we set it to 0.01.
Profile Updating. We update the histograms using an exponential discount
factor, expressed in terms of the time window W and its respective sampling
frequency. Every month we recursively count the values of the features in the
previous months discounted by a factor λ = e−τ/W , where W = 365 days (up
to 1 year). The rationale is that business activities are typically carried out,
throughout an entire year, with a monthly basis. The parameter τ/W influences
the speed with which the exponential decay forgets past data. In our case we
empirically we set τ = 5, because it seemed to best discount past data with
respect to time and sampling windows.
Undertrained and New Users. An undertrained user is a user that per-
formed a low number of transactions. In BankSealer this value is a parameter,
which empirically we set at T = 3 as this is enough to get rid of most of the
false positives due to undertraining.
For undertrained users, we consider their global profile (see §3.2) and select
a cluster of similar users. For each incoming transaction, our system calculates
the anomaly score using the local profile of both the undertrained user and the
k nearest neighbor users (according to the Mahalanobis distance as detailed in
§3.2). For new users, we adopt the same strategy. However, given the absence of
a global profile, we consider all the users as neighbors.
3.2 Global Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to characterize “classes” of spending patterns. Dur-
ing training, we first create a global profile for each user. Then, we cluster the
resulting profiles using an iterative version of the DBSCAN. Finally, for each
global profile we calculate the CBLOF score, which tells the analyst to what
extent a user profile is anomalous with respect to its closest cluster. The global
profile is also leveraged to find local profiles for undertrained or new users. The
rationale is that users belonging to the same cluster exhibit spending patterns
with similar local profiles.
Training and Feature Extraction. Each user is represented as a fea-
ture vector of six components: total number of transactions, average transaction
amount, total amount, average time span between subsequent transactions, num-
ber of transactions executed from foreign countries, number of transactions to
foreign recipients (bank transfers dataset only). To find classes of users with
similar spending patterns, we apply an iterative version of the DBSCAN, using
the Mahalanobis distance [11] between the aforementioned vectors.
To mitigate the drawbacks of the classic DBSCAN when applied to skewed
and unbalanced datasets such as ours (i.e., one large cluster and many small
clusters), we run 10 iterations for decreasing values of ε from 10 to 0.2, which is
the maximum distance to consider two users as connected (i.e., density similar).
High values of this parameters yield a few large clusters, whereas low values
yield many small clusters. At each iteration, we select the largest cluster and
apply DBSCAN to its points with the next value of ε. The smaller clusters at
each iterations are preserved. We stop the iterations whenever the number of
clusters exhibits an abrupt increase (i.e., a knee). In all of our experiments, we
empirically observed that this happens at 0.2. As a result, we obtain a set of
clusters, which contain similar user profiles.
Anomaly Score Calculation and Updating. The global profile is used
to assign each user profile a global anomaly score, which tells the analyst how
“uncommon” their spending pattern is. For this, we compute the unweighted-
CBLOF [2] score, which considers small clusters as outliers with respect to large
clusters. More precisely, the more a user profile deviates from the dense cluster
of “normal” users, the higher his or her anomaly score will be. The CBLOF
anomaly score is the minimum distance of a user profile from the centroid of
the nearest largest cluster. CBLOF takes only two parameters (α and β), which
we evaluated empirically by considering as “normal” the 90%-percentile of the
user profiles. The clustering is re-run according to the sampling frequency (i.e.,
1 month). Moreover, we update the CBLOF anomaly score using an exponential
discount, as described in §3.1.
3.3 Temporal Profiling
The goal of this profiling is to deal with frauds that exploit the repetition
of legitimate-looking transactions over time (e.g., frequent wire transfers of
Table 2: Amount transferred for each dataset and scenario.
Fraud scenario Amount transferred (e)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
1: Information Stealing 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
2: Transaction Hijacking 10,000–50,000 250–255 750–1,000
3: Stealthy Fraud very low amount 50–100 5–10 50–100
low amount 100–500 10–25 100–250
medium amount 500–1,000 25–50 250–500
amounts that not violating the local or global profile). We construct a tempo-
ral profile for each user having a sufficient amount of past transactions. During
training, we aggregate the transactions of each user over time and calculate the
sample mean and variance of the numerical features. These are used as thresholds
during runtime to calculate the anomaly score as the delta.
After a first training, updating profiles and anomaly scores is necessary be-
cause users may change their spending habits. We use a time window, which
size can be easily chosen given the hardware resources available, as show by
our experiments. Within such time window, the features of the transactions are
aggregated with a daily sampling frequency.
Training and Feature Extraction. For each user, we extract the following
aggregated features: total amount, total and maximum daily number of trans-
actions. During training, we compute the mean and standard deviation for each
feature, and set a threshold at mean plus standard deviation to classify trans-
actions as anomalous. Undertrained users are excluded from temporal profiling
because occasional transactions have a high variance, unsuitable for this kind of
analysis. The anomaly scores are updated as in the global profile (i.e., exponen-
tial discount to account for evolving spending habits).
Runtime and Anomaly Score Calculation. xAt runtime, according to
the sampling frequency, we calculate the cumulative value for each of the afore-
mentioned features for each user. Then, we calculate the delta between each
cumulative value and the respective threshold. Positive deltas are summed up
to form the anomaly score.
4 Experimental Evaluation
The goals of our evaluation is to measure (1) the effectiveness and (2) the compu-
tational resource requirements of BankSealer in correctly ranking fraudulent
transactions never seen before among the top.
4.1 Dataset Description and Fraud Scenarios
We obtained 3 months of anonymized data collected from a large national con-
sumer bank between April and June 2013: we used 2 months for training and 1
month for testing, as suggested in [9, pp.359–364].
The dataset consists of 371,137 bank transfers (47,650 users), the money
transfers made from any account of the bank to any other account, 54,141 prepaid
cards transactions (16,093 users), the transactions to top up credit on prepaid
cards, and 34,986 phone recharge transactions (8,415 users), the transactions to
refill prepaid cellphone accounts. The dataset is unlabeled, but it contains no
known frauds as confirmed by the bank we collaborate with.
The evaluation of BankSealer is particularly difficult because, like any
unsupervised analysis tool, it produces novel knowledge. In addition, no frauds
were known or reported at the bank in the 3 months of observation. Therefore,
we relied on domain experts (bank operators) to enrich our testing dataset with
generated frauds based on three fraud scenarios that, based on their experience,
well replicate the typical real attacks performed against online banking users.
We focus on the most important and challenging fraud schemes nowadays, those
driven by banking trojans (e.g., ZeuS, Citadel) or phishing.
Scenario 1: Info stealing. The trojan modifies the login form to deceive
the victim into entering an one time password (OTP) along with the login cre-
dentials. This information is used by the fraudster to execute a transaction (with
a high amount) towards a his account, where the victim never sent money to.
We test both the case of the connection coming from a national and foreign
IP address. To inject the fraud, we randomly choose a victim from the testing
dataset and used a random timestamp for the transaction.
Scenario 2: Transaction Hijacking. The trojan, not the fraudster, hijacks
a legitimate bank transfer by manipulating the victim’s browser. The challenge is
that the connection comes from the victim’s computer and IP address. Moreover,
we execute the fraudulent transaction within ten minutes from a real one, to
emulate a session hijacking.
Scenario 3: Stealthy Fraud. The strategy of the fraudster is to execute
a series of low–medium amount transactions, repeated daily for one month dur-
ing working hours, to better blend in. We analyze three cases (very low, low
and medium daily amounts). We use the same number of users of the previous
scenarios, each performing 30 fraudulent transaction.
For the bank transfers dataset, the money can be transferred to a national
or foreign account, whereas for the phone recharges and prepaid debit cards
the money is charged on an unknown card. Tab. 2 shows the amounts for each
dataset and scenario.
4.2 Evaluation Approach and Metrics
After training, we inject n fraudulent transactions (or users) in the testing
dataset. Then, we use the local profiles to rank transactions, and the tempo-
ral profiles to rank users, according to the respective anomaly scores. The global
profiles are used to mitigate undertraining.
We analyze the top n transactions or users in the ranking, where n is the
number of injected transactions (or users). In our case, n accounts for 1% of the
testing dataset. Depending on the specific scenario, a fraud may trigger either
the local or temporal profile, or both. Either way, thanks to the presence of
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Figure 2: True positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) for n ∈ [1, N ], where
N is the size of the testing dataset. The label “UT” stands for “undertraining”. In
Scenario 1 and 2 BankSealer detects about 98.26% of the frauds with 99.98% of
precision (0.19% FPR). Scenario 3 (users) is the most challenging because of stealthy,
small-amount frauds: BankSealer still detect 69.73% fraudulent users with 83.10%
of precision (14.03% FPR).
both profiling, the analyst is able to notice the fraud. We count as true positives
the number of fraudulent transactions (or users) in the top n positions, and the
remainder ones (to the whole n) are either false positives or negatives.
The overall results are summarized in Fig. 2. BankSealer outperforms
the state of the art. For instance, [15] detects up to 60–70% of the frauds with
an unreported precision. Remarkably, the effect of undertraining is negligible.
Experiment 1: Well-trained Users. We first tested BankSealer with-
out the noise due to non well-trained users (i.e., we removed users with less than
3 transactions from the dataset). All test are repeated 10 times and the results
are averaged to avoid biases.
As Tab. 3 shows, the combination of local and temporal profiles guaran-
tees that frauds are ranked high at either transaction level, thanks to the local
profiles, or user level, thanks to the temporal profile.
The results on the information stealing frauds (Scenario 1) are very promis-
ing. Transaction hijacking frauds (Scenario 2) are particularly challenging, be-
cause the malware does not alter the overall amount of transactions performed:
It leverages existing transactions by diverting them to a different recipient. The
IP address is one of those usually used by the user and, in the case where the
recipient fraudulent account is national, these transactions blend in quite easily.
It is likely that with more training data these features will become more signif-
icant. However, even for this last case, thanks to the temporal profile anomaly
score BankSealer correctly ranked 58% of the frauds, up to 89% in the case of
the phone recharges dataset. Indeed, if we consider the action of refilling phones
or prepaid cards, we expect users to do this only towards a few fixed numbers or
cards. This means that a recharge towards an unknown phone number or card
Table 3: Experiment 1 results on transactions and users. Blank cells indicate inappli-
cable dataset-scenario combinations (e.g., phone recharge transactions have no IBAN,
phone recharge or prepaid card transactions are only nation-wise).
Fraud scenario Correctly ranked frauds (%)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
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1: Information Stealing foreign IP and IBAN 98 57 96 87 95 68
foreign IP, national IBAN 91 57
national IP, foreign IBAN 98 57 87 95 67 96
national IP and IBAN 91 57
2: Transaction Hijacking foreign 75 58
national 22 58 83 89 71 77
3: Stealthy Fraud foreign, very low amount 73 64
foreign, low amount 68 67
foreign, medium amount 69 73
national, very low amount 42 64 64 97 99 93
national, low amount 37 67 94 99 92 97
national, medium amount 42 72 95 99 94 98
is always anomalous, even if the transaction amounts is low and the IP address
of the connection is one of those commonly used by the user.
Stealthy frauds (Scenario 3) are also challenging: the local profile performs
well when the recipient account is foreign, or with phone recharge and prepaid
card frauds. Interestingly, stealthy frauds involving very low amounts (50–100e)
are correctly ranked better than transactions involving low amounts (100–500e).
The reason is because the very-low amounts are rarer in the dataset, and thus
obtain higher anomaly scores.
Experiment 2: Undertrained and New Users. We evaluated the ca-
pabilities of the global profile to lookup a good replacement local profile for
undertrained and new users. We proceeded similarly to what we did in the pre-
vious experiment, injecting 1% of fraudulent transactions, but we spread the
injections evenly across well trained, undertrained, and new users.
Tab. 4 summarizes the percentage of correctly ranked transactions overall,
for well-trained users only, for undertrained uses only, and finally for new users
only. Performance is similar to the previous experiment, even if the percentage
of correctly ranked frauds are obviously a little lower due to the additional noise.
The fact that undertrained sometimes obtain better ranking than well-trained
users, especially when in the attack scenario the frauds are masked to be similar
to common transactions, is an artifact due to the fact that in undertrained
users’ profiles even frauds designed to appear as legitimate transactions can
receive a high score if the (few) transactions already observed for them are very
different from the injected ones. Frauds injected in new users, instead, are ranked
incorrectly when are designed to be similar to legitimate transactions. This is
due to the fact that, for new users, transactions are tested against the average
Table 4: Experiment 2 results on well-trained, undertrained, new users only, and
overall. As in Tab. 3, blank cells indicate inapplicable dataset-scenario combinations.
Fraud scenario Correctly ranked frauds (%)
Bank transfers Phone recharges Prepaid cards
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1: Information Stealing foreign IP and IBAN 96 98 99 92 80 99 99 43 80 85 94 59
foreign IP, national IBAN 75 81 95 52
national IP, foreign IBAN 95 97 93 88 76 97 100 29 73 81 96 42
national IP and IBAN 73 84 93 41
2: Transaction Hijacking foreign 63 43 91 51
national 24 13 57 3 40 29 83 6
3: Stealthy Fraud foreign, very low amount 52 40 91 22
foreign, low amount 56 38 92 39
foreign, medium amount 61 42 93 49 32 18 73 6
national, very low amount 27 13 68 1 16 3 42 4 56 45 94 28
national, low amount 29 14 71 2 19 5 51 0 59 40 91 47
national, medium amount 34 19 78 3 19 2 56 0 72 64 94 59
profile of all transactions in the dataset, and thus transaction with common
attributes will receive low scores.
In the experiments on the phone recharges dataset, we obtain a slightly lower
percentage of correctly ranked frauds than those in Tab. 3. On the other hand,
for the stealthy fraud (Scenario 3) the percentages are considerably lower. A
factor is the huge number of undertrained users in the phone recharges dataset
(2,932 transactions for well trained users vs. 11,505 transactions in total). Similar
considerations hold for the prepaid cards dataset, in particular for the higher
percentage of correctly ranked frauds with undertrained users.
Experiment 3: Performance and Resource Requirements. To test the
performance of BankSealer, we measured both the computational require-
ments at runtime (as this is a constraint for the practical use of the system
in production), and peak memory requirements at training time (as this is a
constraint on the dimension of the dataset that can be handled).
Table 5: Computation time required at runtime under various conditions. In the
typical use case, the system works on a daily basis, thus requiring 6 minutes (worst
case).
Testing interval Elapsed time
Bank transfers Phone recharge Prepaid cards
1 day, no undertrained/new users 1′00′′ 0′18′′ 0′07′′
1 day, undertrained/new users 4′00′′ 0′24′′ 0′10′′
1 month, no undertrained/new users 6′00′′ 0′30′′ 0′12′′
1 month, undertrained/new users 93′00′′ 2′30′′ 1′00′′
For computational power requirements, we tested the time to analyze one
day and one month of data, both with and without the handling of undertrained
and new users explained in §3.1. Our experiments have been executed on a
desktop-class machine with a quad-core, 3.40Ghz Intel i5-3570 CPU, 8GB of
RAM, running Linux 3.7.10 x86 64. Processing times are taken using the time
library. The results are listed in Tab. 5. As we can see, the processing time
varies on the basis of the context being tested, and there is a significant difference
induced by the handling of undertrained/new users. In production BankSealer
will analyze transactions day by day. Therefore, the maximum time required
would be 4 minutes per day for the bank transfers context. In conclusion, we
believe that BankSealer could be suitable for online fraud monitoring.
We tested the scalability of the system by measuring the RAM consumption
at training time, which is the most memory-intensive phase. We used the bank
transfers dataset, the largest one. We relied on memory-profiler and psutil . As
Fig. 3 shows, the peak RAM consumption increases linearly with the number of
days and quadratically with the number of users. This is expected, as the most
memory-intensive data structure is the distance matrix, a square matrix of the
size of the number of users.
5 Discussion
The main barrier in this research field is the lack of publicly available, real-world
frauds and a ground truth for validation. Indeed, we had to resort to synthetically
generated frauds. The absence of non-anonymized text fields does not allow us
to analyze, for instance, their semantics. In future extensions, BankSealer will
compute the models on the bank side and export privacy-preserving statistics
for evaluation.
The prototype is also constrained by the RAM consumption of the clustering
phase. This technical limitation can be mitigated in two possible ways. First, a
triangular data structure to store the distance matrix. Second, a parallel version
of DBSCAN [16], which splits the dataset on multiple machine.
Figure 3: RAM requirements for increasing values of W (left) and users profiled
(right).
6 Related Work
Fraud detection, mainly focused on credit card fraud, is a wide research topic,
for which we refer the reader to [5,14,4].
Limiting our review to the field to banking fraud detection, supervised ap-
proaches based on contrast patterns and contrast sets (e.g., [3]) have been ap-
plied. Along a similar line [1] proposed a rule-based Internet banking fraud de-
tection system. The proposed technique does not work in real time and thus
is profoundly different from ours. Also, supervised techniques require labeled
samples, differently from BankSealer.
The unsupervised approach presented in [15] is interesting as it mitigates
the shortcomings of contrast pattern mining by considering the dependence be-
tween events at different points in time. However, [15] deals with the logs of
the online banking web application, and thus does not detect frauds as much
as irregular interactions with the application. Among the unsupervised learning
methods, [12] proposed an effective detection mechanism to identify legitimate
users and trace their unlawful activities using Hidden Markov Model (HMM)s.
[10] is based on an unsupervised modeling of local and global observations of
users’ behavior, and relies on differential analysis to detect frauds as deviations
from normal behavior. This evidence is strengthened or weakened by the users’
global behavior. The major drawback of this approach is that the data collection
must happen on the client side, which makes it cumbersome to deploy in large,
real-world scenarios. In general, a major difference between existing unsupervised
and semi-supervised approaches and BankSealer is that they do not give the
analyst a motivation for the analysis results, making manual investigation and
confirmation more difficult.
7 Conclusions
BankSealer is an effective online banking semi-supervised and unsupervised
fraud and anomaly detection approach, with which we implemented a decision
support system developed in close collaboration with a large national bank,
which deployed it in a pilot project. Even with the strict requirements typical
of banking scenarios (e.g., anonymized datasets), we showed that it is possible
to create a decision support system that helps the analyst understanding the
reasons behind frauds.
Most of the future works that aim to overcome BankSealer’s limitations
require more detailed datasets, which are often difficult to obtain due to privacy
restrictions. Some examples are the semantic analysis of the text attributes, im-
provements of the temporal profile, and the estimation of the number of trans-
actions required to fully train a profile.
A short-term work is to consider the feedback given by the analyst, which
however requires careful evaluation because of the possible biases that an ana-
lyst may introduce. To this end, we currently deployed BankSealer in a real
world environment, to collect the feedback of banking analysts on the detected
anomalies.
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